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gender assistance strategies. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Haiti was thrown into chaos when an earthquake with a magnitude of 7.0 struck on 
January 12, 2010. 1.5 million people, nearly 15 percent of the population, were directly 
affected. Over 220,000 people were killed, and an additional 300,000 were injured. The 
earthquake shattered not only physical infrastructure, but also the economic, healthcare, 
and governance apparatuses of the Haitian state. Immediately following the earthquake, 
1.3 million people were living in temporary shelters in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan 
area.1 Humanitarian organizations, both local and international, sprang into action to 
address the immediate needs of the affected population.  
 
The response to the earthquake was one of the largest and most complex undertaken by the 
international community at that time. Individuals and governments around the world 
donated money to the response, and aid agencies mobilized human resources and funding 
as quickly as possible. The international community pledged approximately $10.4 billion for 
humanitarian relief and recovery efforts, including debt relief, and an additional $3.1 
billion was contributed through private charitable donations. $6.4 billion of this total 
commitment had been disbursed as of July 2014.2 Between January 2010 and September 
2014, the U.S. government alone spent $1.3 billion in humanitarian relief assistance and 
$1.8 billion in recovery, reconstruction, and development – a total of $3.1 billion in aid to 
Haiti.3 As the response took form, it became increasingly clear that women were 
disproportionately affected by the disruption of normal community structures, and rates of 
sexual assault increased rapidly.4 Many women had previously played a major role in the 
informal economy and struggled financially when markets were shut down.5  While working 
to ensure security and market access in the short-term, aid agencies began to realize that 
the Haiti response would require long-term disaster risk reduction (DRR) programming to 
increase community resilience and reduce risk in the case of future natural disasters. Haiti 
is a particularly interesting context in which to examine gender-responsive DRR policy and 
programming because of the widely perceived disparity between resources committed and 
outcomes gained. 
 
The international community overlooked women’s specific needs and failed to incorporate 
women’s voices in their response. The post-disaster needs assessment (PDNA) published by 
the Haitian government, with support of the World Bank, largely overlooked women’s 
                                                
1 Government of Haiti and The World Bank, Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damage, Losses, General and Sectoral 
Needs, no. 70102, (March 2010): 5, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/06/19/000333038_20120619012320/Rendered/PDF/70
1020ESW0P1190R0Haiti0PDNA020100EN.pdf.  
2 Assessing Progress in Haiti Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-162, 128 Stat. 1858 (2014).  
3 United States Department of State, “Government Assistance to Haiti: 2010 to 2015,” (December 2014), 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/USG-Assistance-in-Haiti-2010-2015.pdf.   
4 Dalberg Global Advisors, Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement, (Washington, DC: Dalberg 
Global Advisors, 2010): viii, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf. 
5 Dalberg Global Advisors, Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement, (Washington, DC: Dalberg 
Global Advisors, 2010): 108, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.  
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particular needs post-disaster, as well as their capabilities to inform and advance recovery 
efforts. The total lack of gender considerations in the PDNA was so stark – and inconsistent 
with the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, as well as all Inter-Agency 
Standing Committee (IASC)6 standards – that a diverse coalition of Haitian and 
international women’s groups published a Gender Shadow Report to supplement the 
missing content.7 The Gender Shadow Report parallels the original PDNA outline, but with 
considerations and recommendations based on gender analysis. The report concluded, 
“without the direct involvement of women, neither sustainable development nor a disaster-
response program [in Haiti] will be successful.”8  
 
This study provides insight into the successes and shortcomings of the response to women’s 
needs in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti earthquake. In order to inform future action, this 
report highlights the importance of gender-responsive emergency response and long-term 
recovery processes. Finally, this study offers a resource to policymakers and practitioners 
for implementing and mainstreaming gender-responsive perspectives and policies. This 
study differs from the Gender Shadow Report by discussing not only immediate relief 
efforts, but long-term recovery and DRR work in Haiti as well, spanning 2010 to 2015. This 
study examines four humanitarian aid organizations—the United Nations Office for the 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID)—in order to analyze diverse modes 
of response, both for immediate post-disaster needs and for long-term capacity-building. 
This study details the policies that guided the response of these organizations in Haiti and 
their evolution between 2010 and 2015 in order to inform future disaster assistance and to 
better incorporate women’s voices in humanitarian response.  
 
There are multiple gaps in the literature on the response to the Haiti earthquake that this 
study seeks to address. The literature is not particularly focused on gender mainstreaming 
in DRR. On the rare occasions that gender was addressed after the earthquake, most of the 
focus was on responding to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). These initiatives, 
while important, were mostly reactive. Rather than an emphasis on prevention, 
programming targeted service provision for SGBV victims or delineated pathways for 
preventing sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) reporting. Broadening the literature’s 
often singular focus on SGBV, this report takes the following questions into consideration: 
What were the impediments to implementing gender mainstreaming for humanitarian aid 
organizations in Haiti?  How could DRR policies have included gender mainstreaming in 
                                                
6 The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) is the primary mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian 
response and involves UN and non-UN humanitarian partners. (See: https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/)  
7 2010 Haiti Equality Collective, The Gender Shadow Report: Ensuring Haitian Women’s Participation and Leadership in All 
Stages of National Relief and Reconstruction, (Haiti: Collectif Haïti Égalité, 2010), 
http://www.genderaction.org/publications/2010/gsr.pdf. 
8 2010 Haiti Equality Collective, The Gender Shadow Report: Ensuring Haitian Women’s Participation and Leadership in All 
Stages of National Relief and Reconstruction, (Haiti: Collectif Haïti Égalité, 2010): 12, 
http://www.genderaction.org/publications/2010/gsr.pdf. 
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areas other than SGBV and PSEA? Is there still a gap between corporate policies and their 
practical implementation? Are gender mainstreaming tools and guidelines available to 
provide guidance to staff and implementing partners? While the literature discusses women 
as a vulnerable group, there is significantly less coverage of women as resilient actors who 
can contribute to disaster risk reduction programming. What opportunities existed for the 
four agencies to utilize women’s knowledge and skillsets as part of prevention and 
response? Finally, the literature is unclear about the degree of accountability between 
contracting organizations and their implementing partners when addressing gender 
mainstreaming. If implementing partners are enacting agency policies, at what stage are 
gender considerations disappearing from programming?  
 
Through these questions, this study examines the level of advancing gender considerations 
in DRR in the four organizations in the five years since the earthquake in Haiti. The 
analysis includes whether gender considerations have been taken into account in the 
design, implementation, and budgeting of DRR programs; identification of the supports and 
barriers to gender mainstreaming considerations; and the formulation of recommendations 
and lessons learned to improve gender mainstreaming in DRR.  
 
The four organizations discussed in this study, as well as the humanitarian community 
more broadly, have undergone significant changes in approaches to women’s needs and 
abilities, both in immediate response and long-term recovery and development. A global 
change in discourse emphasizing women’s unique needs and agency has led to the 
increasing institutionalization of these issues in policy and practice for humanitarian, DRR, 
and development organizations. Institutional reform creates policies to facilitate change, 
but individuals are often the ones who make the real difference in incorporating women’s 
needs and abilities into programming. Specific individuals and teams who have a 
background or interest in working on gender are often the ones who push for gender 
mainstreaming in program design and accountability mechanisms. In the wake of a 
disaster, humanitarian organizations have tremendous potential to address fundamental 
needs of women and girls, and to begin building a more equitable and more inclusive 
society.  
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II. Methodology 
 
The analysis and findings in this study are derived from a multifaceted qualitative data 
collection method that sought to understand the extent to which gender mainstreaming was 
incorporated in the response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, and whether there were any 
changes to their DRR policies since the earthquake to 2015. OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and 
USAID were chosen as the subjects of this study because they are major actors in the 
humanitarian and DRR sectors, and because their activities represent the full range of 
disaster response and disaster preparedness efforts, from short-term recovery to long-term 
capacity-building.  
 
A thorough review of academic literature, reports from organizations involved in the 
response to the 2010 earthquake, assessments of the response to the 2010 earthquake, and 
newspaper and magazine articles about the earthquake and emergency response was 
conducted. This provided an understanding of the state of art concerning the response, 
assessments of gender mainstreaming, and the media coverage of the earthquake in Haiti. 
 
The study also involved a comprehensive textual analysis of 167 publications and reports 
released by OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID. These documents included annual 
reports, country reports, DRR strategic frameworks, DRR strategic plans, DRR operational 
plans, senior management memos, needs assessments, DRR preparedness toolkits, gender 
and DRR toolkits, fact sheets, monitoring and evaluation reports, and risk assessments. 
These documents were studied to understand how often and when the organizations 
referenced gender, how gender is incorporated into descriptions and expectations of 
programming, and the context in which gender is discussed. This process was crucial to 
understanding which types of documents and programming emphasize gender-
responsiveness or sex-disaggregated data. The findings of the textual analysis were 
compared against a set of coded, semi-structured interviews.  
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted between December 2015 and January 2016 
with a total of 27 key informants at OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, USAID, and at implementing 
partners of these organizations. A sample of five individuals at senior and mid-levels, 
stationed at headquarters and in Haiti, were interviewed from each of the four 
organizations. The criteria for selection consisted of individuals whose work focused on 
Haiti, DRR, and/or gender mainstreaming at these organizations between 2010 and 2015, 
to understand how staff responded to the earthquake in Haiti, their conceptualization of 
gender and DRR, and what has changed since the 2010 response. Individuals9 from 
implementing partners of these organizations, specifically the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO) as an implementing partner for OCHA, the Croix Rouge Française 
                                                
9 One or two individuals from each implementing organization were interviewed, focusing on their organization’s response in 
Haiti from 2010 to 2015. These individuals were mid-level professionals who were all deployed in Haiti during the relevant 
time frame. 
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(CRF) and J/P Haitian Relief Organization (J/P HRO) as implementing partners for 
UNHCR, and the World Food Programme (WFP) as an implementing partner for USAID, 
were also included in the sample to understand the relationship between contracting or 
coordinating agencies’ gender mainstreaming policies and partners’ implementation work. 
These implementation partners were selected based on organizations that received the 
greatest funding from OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, or USAID through analysis of funding 
documents. It was not possible to interview individuals working for implementing partners 
for UNEP, as its funding documents and budgets were not available to the research team. 
Specific attention was paid to gender mainstreaming within these organizations and 
accountability mechanisms for reporting to donor or partner organizations. These 
interviews focused on the individual’s responsibilities at their organization, the extent to 
which gender mainstreaming was incorporated into their daily work, their contact with 
gender focal points or gender specialists, whether their organization or office was able to 
collect sex-disaggregated data, and the challenges they experienced in implementing gender 
mainstreaming. While the information gathered through interviews with individuals at 
implementing partners was very helpful for understanding the response and overall DRR 
programming, data from these interviews were not included in this report, as it was not 
possible to show a direct link between the policies and practices of coordinating or 
contracting agencies and the policies and practices of implementing partners. Further 
research could help to illuminate how gender mainstreaming policies are connected 
between coordinating and contracting agencies and implementing partners. Inductive 
thematic analysis was used to develop themes from data collected in the semi-structured 
interviews.  
 
This study will provide a brief socioeconomic background of Haiti, a discussion of the main 
definitions and themes in emergency response and DRR programming, and an overview of 
the vulnerabilities of Haitian communities, and especially women, that were exacerbated by 
the 2010 earthquake. This study will then provide an analysis of OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, 
and USAID response immediately following the earthquake, then an overview of the 
changes in programming and policy that have taken place between 2010 and 2015.  
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III. Socioeconomic Background 
 
Haiti is the poorest country in the Western hemisphere, enduring decades of endemic 
poverty exacerbated by political instability and periodic natural disasters. This confluence 
of factors undermined Haiti’s ability to withstand a catastrophic natural disaster such as 
the January 2010 earthquake. The severity of the disaster, combined with a struggling 
economy and weak governance institutions, impeded Haiti’s resilience in the face of the 
shock brought on by the earthquake. Six years later, Haiti – despite significant 
international aid and an influx of resources post-disaster – continues to struggle to bounce 
back. Despite these challenges – given the country’s long history of violence, rebellion, and 
emergencies caused by natural disasters – Haitians are neither unfamiliar with disaster 
nor entirely incapable of recovering from them. Haitians are neither helpless nor hopeless 
in the wake of natural disasters. 
 
Covering an area of 10,714 square miles, Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola with its 
relatively wealthier and more stable neighbor the Dominican Republic. With a population of 
10.6 million, Haiti is the third-most populous country in the Caribbean region,10 with a 
GDP per capita of $852 in 2014.11 In 2010, Haiti was ranked 145th out of 182 countries in 
the Human Development Index published by the United Nations. Socioeconomic inequality 
within Haiti is vast, with nearly two-thirds of the population living in poverty.12  
 
Yet to write Haiti off as a failed state – as many non-Haitian observers are wont to do – is 
an overly simplistic generalization about a country with a rich and complex political, 
economic, and sociocultural history. A lucrative French colony due to its sugar cane 
plantations, Haiti declared independence from France in 1804 following a rebellion led by 
African and native slaves.13 Post-independence, sugar and cotton production intensified, 
becoming sources of export revenue for the fledgling country, which was largely shunned or 
met with hostility by Western powers.  
 
In 1957, Francois Duvalier, or ‘Papa Doc,’ became president of Haiti. Centralization of 
power, growth of black interests, oppression of minorities, and a total intolerance for 
dissent or pluralism characterized Duvalier’s rule, which lasted until 1971. His son, Jean-
Claude Duvalier, or ‘Baby Doc,’ who succeeded him and ruled until 1986, emulated 
                                                
10 International Monetary Fund, “Country Specific Notes: Dominican Republic and Haiti: Population (Persons),” World 
Economic Outlook Database, (April 2015), accessed February 8, 2016, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2015/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=87&pr.y=3&sy=2015&ey=2015&scsm=1&ssd=1&
sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=263%2C243&s=LP&grp=0&a=.  
11 International Monetary Fund, “Country Specific Notes: Haiti: Gross domestic product per capita (U.S. dollars),” World 
Economic Outlook Database, (October 2014), accessed February 8, 2016, 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?pr.x=58&pr.y=15&sy=2014&ey=2018&scsm=1&ssd=1
&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=263&s=NGDPD%2CNGDPDPC%2CPPPGDP%2CPPPPC%2CLP&grp=0&a=.    
12 The World Bank, “Countries: Haiti Overview,” accessed February 8, 2016, 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview.  
13 Kate Hodgson, “‘Internal Harmony, Peace to the Outside World’: Imagining Community in Nineteenth-Century Haiti,” 
Paragraph 37, no. 2 (July 2014): 179, doi:10.3366/para.2014.0120.  
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Duvalier’s strong-armed, repressive approach to governance.14 Between 1986 and 2004, 
political chaos ensued; Haiti experienced several regime changes and violent 
demonstrations, as well as an American diplomatic and military intervention to restore 
order to the country. Although multiple elections took place, there were allegations of fraud, 
including in 2000 when Jean-Baptiste Aristide – who had previously been elected president 
in the early 1990s – returned to office. Aristide’s return to power was controversial, marred 
by electoral violence, human rights abuses, a boycott of the election by the opposition, and a 
growing rebellion amongst his dissenters.  
 
Aristide was deposed in 2004 after a coup d’état that plunged the country into another 
period of political uncertainty. Later that year, the Security Council responded by passing 
resolution 1542, thereby establishing the United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH), which was deployed to mitigate the threat to international peace and 
security posed by the violence and upheaval triggered by the coup.15 Peacekeeping troops 
have been operating in Haiti since the 1990s, often in contention with the local Haitian 
population. The 2010 earthquake destroyed several UN facilities and caused significant 
damage to MINUSTAH operations. The earthquake killed multiple senior officials, 
including the Head of Mission, Hedi Annabi. While MINUSTAH’s original role in Haiti was 
a political one, they became involved by necessity in the earthquake recovery process.  
 
The 2010 earthquake shone a spotlight on the socioeconomic challenges faced by Haitians, 
but underdevelopment and political mismanagement of resources had long existed.16 
Although Haiti received some $4 billion in foreign aid between 1990 and 2003, the level of 
human development in the country remains low due to corruption, poor governance, and 
weak institutions. Political turmoil has meant the lack of access to basic services such as 
education and health, especially in rural and remote areas. Prior to the earthquake, more 
than two-thirds of all health services in the country were provided by non-governmental 
organizations.17 Only two-thirds of primary-aged and one-third of secondary-aged children 
are enrolled in school.  
 
Geographical disparities in income are a particular concern: nearly 70 percent of rural 
households are considered chronically poor, while that figure drops to 20 percent in cities.18 
The rates of extreme poverty in rural areas have held steady, while slowly decreasing in 
                                                
14 R. Anthony Lewis, “Language, Culture and Power: Haiti under the Duvaliers, Caribbean Quarterly 50, no. 4 (December 
2004), 42-51, http://proxy.library.georgetown.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/221161053?accountid=11091.  
15 United Nations Security Council (SC), Resolution 1542, “On Establishment of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti 
(MINUSTAH),” April 30, 2004, http://www.refworld.org/docid/48bfc5642.html.   
16 Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and 
Human Development in Haiti," Journal of Economic Issues 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 527-558, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-
3624450301. 
17 Alex Dupuy, “Commentary Beyond the Earthquake: A Wake-Up Call for Haiti,” Latin American Perspectives 37, no. 3 (May 
2010): 195-204, doi: 10.1177/0094582X10366539. 
18 The World Bank, “Living Conditions in Haiti’s Capital Improve, but Rural Communities Remain Very Poor,” (July 11, 
2014), accessed February 10, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/11/while-living-conditions-in-port-au-
prince-are-improving-haiti-countryside-remains-very-poor.   
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cities,19 a fact which, along with severe environmental degradation in the countryside, has 
led to significant migration to cities – nearly 57 percent of the total population now lives in 
urban areas.20 In concentrated urban settings, such as the capital Port-au-Prince, many 
households are precariously crammed together in haphazard buildings, often built with 
cheap cement or without adequate foundations.21 Rapid deforestation has increased people’s 
vulnerability to storms, mudslides, soil erosion, and other environmental problems.22 In 
fact, even though the 2010 earthquake was catastrophic, Haiti had experienced multiple 
other significant natural disasters – albeit of lesser scale – in recent years. Haiti’s 
vulnerabilities exacerbate the impact of any potential natural disaster. Hurricanes Jeanne 
and Hanna, in 2004 and 2008 respectively, left a combined 3,500 dead in Haiti – a stark 
comparison to the combined death toll of 19 in the Dominican Republic.  
 
Haiti’s ability to deal with large-scale natural disasters is limited, and, therefore, the state 
relies on foreign aid in the aftermath of such events. However, as Pyles and Svistova argue, 
“the majority of relief work is actually conducted by local survivors,” but this is oftentimes 
“lost on mass media” prone to “highlight[ing] the heroics of foreign first responders.”23 Local 
resilience is aided by the strong local agricultural industry, comprising almost a quarter of 
GDP and employing half the labor force. Remittances are also a major source of income for 
many Haitians, who depend on relatives abroad for their livelihood and comprise twenty 
percent of the GDP.24  
 
Despite this, longstanding vulnerabilities remain. Gender inequality – in health, education, 
economic opportunity, and political participation – is a systemic problem that 
disenfranchises women. Padgett and Warnecke, in explaining Haiti’s poor socioeconomic 
indicators and political failures, note, “institutional arrangements within Haiti have 
perpetuated hierarchical power relations and gendered socioeconomic outcomes.”25 Women 
are significant contributors to the informal economy in Haiti, as well as relentless 
entrepreneurs, but are often underpaid, lack reliable and consistent work, and have 
difficulty accessing credit.26 Despite being a critical and significant part of the country’s 
                                                
19 The World Bank, “Living Conditions in Haiti’s Capital Improve, but Rural Communities Remain Very Poor,” (July 11, 
2014), accessed February 10, 2016, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/07/11/while-living-conditions-in-port-au-
prince-are-improving-haiti-countryside-remains-very-poor.   
20 The World Bank, “Urban population (% of total),” The World Bank DataSet, (2015), accessed February 10, 2016, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS.  
21 “Why Was the Destruction So Severe?” Inside Disaster, accessed February 10, 2016, http://insidedisaster.com/haiti/the-
quake/why-was-the-destruction-so-severe  
22 Benedetta F. Duramy, Gender and Violence in Haiti: Women’s Path from Victims to Agents, (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 2014). 
23 Benedetta F. Duramy, Gender and Violence in Haiti: Women’s Path from Victims to Agents, (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 2014), 60. 
24 Migration Policy Institute, “Remittances Profile: Haiti,” MPI Data Hub, (2011), accessed February 10, 2016, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/Haiti.pdf.  
25 Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and 
Human Development in Haiti," Journal of Economic Issues 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 527-558, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-
3624450301. 
26 Nedjée Mauconduit, Bénédique Paul, and Etzer S. Emile, “Women and Economic Development: Women Entrepreneurship 
Situation in Haiti,” Haiti Perspectives 2, no. 3 (August 2013): 61-67, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2375608. 
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informal labor force, women are often subject to unique gendered pressures and challenges. 
Women are responsible for the overwhelming majority of unpaid household and caregiving 
work, which undercuts their productive potential, as well as their opportunities for 
educational growth. This “time poverty” disempowers women and girls from a young age 
and throughout their lives.27 Haiti has the highest fertility rate in the LAC region, 
resultant from cultural pressures on women to reproduce, as well as a lack of adequate 
access to family planning resources.28 
 
Violence against women – including domestic abuse and sexual violence – is highly 
prevalent in Haiti, which has devastating economic, health, and social consequences. In 
2012, the Haiti Demographic and Health Survey reported that 29 percent of women have 
experienced intimate partner violence29 – and this figure does not account for the many 
more cases that go unreported. The prevalence of violence against women is a complicated 
phenomenon caused by economic pressures, cultural norms, political instability, and the 
strongly patriarchal society that dictates the status of women as subordinate to men. At the 
same time, violence against women has also been politicized in Haiti, especially when 
committed in the context of conflict or rebellion and sanctioned by authorities as part of 
inter-group hostilities.30 Until 2005, rape was not classified as a crime under law, and 
impunity for domestic or intimate-partner violence remains high.31  
 
Prior to the 2010 earthquake, women were also grossly underrepresented in public office. 
Women occupied mere four percent of parliamentary seats (2007-2010) and led only one-
tenth of cabinet ministries in 2008.32 Although there is a Ministry of Women’s Affairs that 
works to address women’s needs, it is underfunded, sidelined, and has limited influence 
overall.33 While the presence of women in elective and high office does not guarantee 
progress for all women citizens, the lack of women in leadership positions does suggest 
another form of gender inequity. Low political participation of women also contributes to 
their systemic marginalization and the perpetuation of gender-blind or even discriminatory 
policies.34 Despite this, women do occupy leadership positions in civil society and have 
historically advocated for their betterment and overall societal change for decades. Haiti 
                                                
27 Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and 
Human Development in Haiti," Journal of Economic Issues 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 527-558, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-
3624450301. 
28 Population Reference Bureau, “2015 World Population Data Sheet with a special focus on women’s empowerment,” (2015), 
http://www.prb.org/pdf15/2015-world-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf  
29 Ministry of Public Health and Population, Haitian Childhood Institute, and ICF International, Haïti: 2012 Mortality, 
Morbidity, and Service Utilization Survey: Key Findings, (Calverton, Maryland: MSPP, IHE, and ICF International, 2013), 
http://dhsprogram.com/pubs/pdf/SR199/SR199.eng.pdf.  
30 Benedetta F. Duramy, Gender and Violence in Haiti: Women’s Path from Victims to Agents, (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 2014). 
31 Alexis Gardella, “Gender Assessment USAID/Haiti,” United States Agency for International Development, (Washington DC: 
United States Agency for International Development, 2006), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pdach597.pdf.   
32 United Nations Statistics Division, “Haiti Series Data,” Millennium Development Goals Indicators, (2015), accessed 
February 10, 2016, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg/Data.aspx.  
33 Beatrice Lindstrom, Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Haiti, Freedom House, (2012): 8, 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/Haiti%20-%20FINAL.pdf.   
34 Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and 
Human Development in Haiti," Journal of Economic Issues 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 536, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450301.  
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has long had a thriving civil society, with women’s organizations acting as community 
networks and mobilizers.35 Despite this, women’s groups are consistently excluded from 
government consultations and even by international aid agencies, including the United 
Nations International Donors Conference36 in March 2010 after the earthquake. Another 
obstacle that undermines effective policies and engagement by foreign and local authorities 
is the lack of sex-disaggregated data, and, in particular, differentiated information about 
urban and rural populations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
35 2010 Haiti Equality Collective, The Gender Shadow Report: Ensuring Haitian Women’s Participation and Leadership in All 
Stages of National Relief and Reconstruction, (Haiti: Collectif Haïti Égalité, 2010), 
http://www.genderaction.org/publications/2010/gsr.pdf. 
36 Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and 
Human Development in Haiti," Journal of Economic Issues 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 542, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-3624450301. 
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IV. A Select Literature Review on Disaster Risk Reduction and 
Gender in Haiti 
 
DRR is the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to 
analyze and reduce the causal factors of disasters.37 In working to create resilient 
communities, DRR policies include disciplines as diverse as agriculture and food systems, 
land tenure and building construction, governmental risk mitigation, and financial and 
education systems.38  
 
The severity of a disaster is also closely tied to gender differences and inequalities. Gender 
equality is critical to sustainable development and, thus, equally critical to DRR policies 
and programming.39 As a cross-cutting issue, gender impacts the diverse systems that DRR 
engages with, from environmental management to education, as well as the post-disaster 
experiences of women and men.  
 
The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) posits, 
“Mainstreaming gender into DRR offers an opportunity for re-examining gender relations 
in society from different angles and enhancing gender equality in socioeconomic 
development…[and]…makes it possible for nations and communities to achieve disaster 
resilience.”40 Mainstreaming gender into DRR before a natural disaster occurs is important 
for achieving effective, gender-sensitive responses and prevention efforts, but it is also an 
opportunity for transforming society and addressing underlying causes of inequality.  
 
Studies show that while women and men may live through the same natural disaster, 
women experience the effects of the disaster in dramatically different ways. As West et al. 
wrote in their seminal report The Needs of Women in Disasters and Emergencies, “Disaster 
is a social product; vulnerability is contingent upon social pre conditions.”41 In a patriarchal 
world, social conditions penalize women. Neumayer and Plümper argue that more women 
than men have been found to die from natural hazards, linked to women’s unequal 
socioeconomic status.42 Even when they are less severe, natural disasters still have 
differentiated impacts on men and women. A report from UNISDR on gender-sensitive 
disaster risk reduction notes that slow-onset hazards leave women with an increased 
workload to collect, store, protect, and distribute water and food for the household, and 
                                                
37 United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction, “What is Disaster Risk Reduction?,” accessed February 10, 2016, 
http://www.unisdr.org/who-we-are/what-is-drr.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Joni Seager and Betsy Hartmann, Mainstreaming Gender in Environmental Assessment and Early Warning, (Nairobi: 
United Nations Environment Program, 2005), http://www.unep.org/dewa/Portals/67/pdf/Mainstreaming_Gender.pdf.   
40 Ibid.   
41 Raymond Wiest, Jane Mocellin, and Thandiwe Motsisi, The Needs of Women in Disasters and Emergencies, United Nations 
Development Program and the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator, (Winnipeg, Manitoba: The University 
of Manitoba, June 1994), http://www.gdnonline.org/resources/women-in-disaster-emergency.pdf.  
42 Eric Neumayer and Thomas Plümper, “The Gendered Nature of Natural Disasters: The Impact of Catastrophic Events on 
the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 97, no. 3 (2007): 551-566, doi: 
10.1111/j.1467 -8306.2007.00563.x.  
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often must head households without the means or social capital to obtain resources for their 
families.43 The same report identified that women also face limited access to credit, 
information, and relief services, making it even more difficult to recover from disaster 
losses.44  
 
While an entire community may be exposed to the same risk, women and men have 
different levels of vulnerability and access to resources, and therefore require different 
types of response programs from humanitarian organizations.45 Often, however, 
organizations do not utilize a gender analysis in their assessments. De Silva’s and 
Jayathilaka’s study on gender-based vulnerabilities found that traditional needs 
assessment surveys did not ask questions that addressed the complexities of women’s needs 
in a post-disaster environment46 – and thus lost much useful information. A study by 
Padgett and Warnecke47 on women in Haiti noted that development programs were not 
addressing longstanding gender inequities in Haitian society, losing valuable opportunities 
to kick start economic development through women’s participation. 
 
The broader scope of women’s vulnerabilities and needs is often reduced to their 
experiences of sexual and gender-based violence. Studies by Schuller48 and Duramy49 
extensively examined sexual violence in Haitian society before the earthquake. These 
studies show that Haitian women did not know what shelters, services, and resources 
related to sexual and gender-based violence were available to them prior to the earthquake, 
which likely carried over into post-earthquake life.50 Following the earthquake, women 
lacked security and protection within camps that were often poorly lit at night, which 
contributed to their insecurity and sexual based violence.51 
 
Few studies have examined how gender was specifically considered in overall disaster 
planning and response policies in Haiti, and what impact this may have had on women’s 
lives and experiences post-earthquake. One of these studies, from Ginige et al., 
demonstrates how gender mainstreaming can help integrate perspectives of women into 
DRR in post-disaster environments to lessen their suffering and support their families and 
                                                
43 United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, United Nations Development Programme, and the 
International Union for the Conservation of Nature, Making Disaster Risk Reduction Gender-Sensitive: Policy and Practical 
Guidelines, (Geneva, Switzerland: UNISDR, UNDP and IUCN, 2009), 
http://www.unisdr.org/files/9922_MakingDisasterRiskReductionGenderSe.pdf.  
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Kushani De Silva and Ramanie Jayathilaka, “Gender in the Context of Disaster Risk Reduction; a case study of a flood risk 
reduction project in the Gampaha District in Sri Lanka,” in “4th International Conference on Building Resilience,” special 
issue, Procedia Economics and Finance 18, (September 2014): 873-881. 
47 Tonia Warnecke and Andrew Padgett, "Diamonds in the Rubble: The Women of Haiti—Institutions, Gender Equity, and 
Human Development in Haiti," Journal of Economic Issues 45, no. 3 (August 2011): 5527-577, doi: 10.2753/JEI0021-
3624450301.   
48 Mark Schuller, “They Forgot about Us! Gender and Haiti's IDP Camps,” Meridians: feminism, race, transnationalism 11, 
no. 1 (Indiana University Press, 2011): 149-157, doi: 10.2979/meridians.11.1.149.  
49 Benedetta F. Duramy, Gender and Violence in Haiti: Women’s Path from Victims to Agents, (New Jersey: Rutgers 
University Press, 2014). 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid.  
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communities.52 Yet gender mainstreaming requires the participation and support of 
multiple actors to be done successfully. In an evaluation on humanitarian aid 
organizations, Mountain argues that when development programs and policies do explicitly 
address gender equity post-disaster – and not only in terms of sexual and gender-based 
violence – donor governments do not necessarily monitor how well these policies were 
implemented by field staff or organizations on the ground.53 However, studies have shown 
that in order to be successful, gender mainstreaming in DRR should consist of two steps: 
identification of women’s DRR knowledge and needs, and the integration of their identified 
knowledge and needs into DRR in their environment.54  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
52 Kanchana, Ginige, Dilanthi Amaratunga, and Richard Haigh, "Tackling women's vulnerabilities through integrating a 
gender perspective into disaster risk reduction in the built environment” in “4th International Conference on Building 
Resilience,” special issue, Procedia Economics and Finance 18 (September 2014): 327-335, doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00947-
2.  
53 Ross Mountain, “Haiti – Now is the time to work on gender issues,” DARA International, (AlertNet, July 2011), 
http://daraint.org/2011/07/12/2360/alertnet-op-ed-haiti-now-is-the-time-to-work-on-gender-issues/.  
54 Kanchana, Ginige, Dilanthi Amaratunga, and Richard Haigh, "Tackling women's vulnerabilities through integrating a 
gender perspective into disaster risk reduction in the built environment” in “4th International Conference on Building 
Resilience,” special issue, Procedia Economics and Finance 18 (September 2014): 327, doi: 10.1016/S2212-5671(14)00947-2. 
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V. Vulnerabilities in the Aftermath of the Earthquake 
 
The 2010 earthquake took a tremendous toll on everyone affected. 220,000 people were 
killed, and 300,000 more were injured. 1.3 million people were living in temporary shelters 
in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area following the earthquake. 105,000 homes were 
destroyed, and 208,000 more were damaged. 50 hospitals or health centers collapsed.55 An 
assessment by Dalberg Global Advisors states,  
“The January 2010 earthquake has exacerbated the already challenging situation in 
Haiti. Health risks have increased overall; levels of domestic violence and rape have 
risen, especially in camps; people have lost assets and have been unable to return to 
work; and legal, judicial, and legislative capacities have been further reduced.”56  
Haiti’s economic, healthcare, and governance structures were seriously weakened. Women 
faced a particularly bleak landscape following the earthquake; already economically 
vulnerable and facing weak healthcare services and high levels of GBV before the 
earthquake, the disaster further marginalized them. 
 
Security 
 
The security situation following the earthquake was threatening for many women. GBV 
was common in the camps, worsened by insufficient police presence and the government’s 
inability to meet the needs of women and children in the camps. Despite attention to these 
gendered security needs, the PDNA did not incorporate an analysis of root causes or 
gender-focused governance reforms. The assessment by Dalberg Global Advisors argues 
that since the earthquake, reported cases of violence and GBV have been alarmingly high, 
especially for girls under 18.57 Data collected in four camps58 revealed that 14 percent of the 
respondents said since the earthquake, one of more members of their household had 
experienced sexual violence.59 Among the victims, 86 percent were women and girls. These 
incidents of sexual violence occurred both during the day and at night, most often when 
women were inside their shelters or on their way to get water.60 A study conducted in Parc 
Jean Marie Vincent camp found that although the UN and Haitian police regularly 
                                                
55 Government of Haiti and The World Bank, Haiti Earthquake PDNA: Assessment of Damage, Losses, General and Sectoral 
Needs, no. 70102, (March 2010): 5, http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/06/19/000333038_20120619012320/Rendered/PDF/70
1020ESW0P1190R0Haiti0PDNA020100EN.pdf. 
56 Dalberg Global Advisors, Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement, (Washington, DC: Dalberg 
Global Advisors, 2010): viii, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf. 
57 Ibid.  
58 Terrain de Golf, Place St. Pierre, Champs de Mars, and Parc Jean Marie Vincent. 
59 Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law. Sexual Violence in Haiti’s IDP Camps: Results of a 
Household Survey, (New York: Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, NYU School of Law, 2011): 3, http://chrgj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/07/HaitiSexualViolenceMarch2011.pdf. 
60 Ibid. 
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patrolled that area, most of the respondents still felt unsafe, citing poor integration of 
security forces into the community.61  
 
The Dalberg report states that the earthquake could reduce health care access, increase 
risks for pregnant women, increase food insecurity, escalate frequency of GBV, increase the 
risk of child trafficking, and increase the risk of HIV infection and ARV incompliance.62 
Most poor women relied on petty commerce to make ends meet, but lost all assets in the 
earthquake and did not have the credit access to start up again. Many fell into debt to feed 
themselves and their families, and many traded sex for food or money to buy cooking fuel.63 
A 2011 UNHCR report states, “the phenomenon or women and adolescent girls engaging in 
transactional sex within IDP (Internally Displaced Person) camps in Port-au-Prince is 
widespread and exemplifies the exacerbation of their precarious and vulnerable conditions. 
They are facing insurmountable obstacles to accessing humanitarian aid and support from 
national authorities, and local and international actors.”64 Women interviewed for this 
study state that their primary motivation for engaging in transactional sex was not only for 
their own survival, but also for the survival of their children.65 Additionally, increased gang 
activity in Port-au-Prince anecdotally made women feel less safe.66 The destruction of 80 
percent of the justice sector in Port-au-Prince made it difficult to process violent crime 
offenders both in and outside of IDP camps. High levels of violence affect women’s ability to 
participate freely in public life and governance structures, but few GBV cases were 
reported, investigated, or prosecuted.67  
 
Health 
 
The earthquake also had serious health consequences for women. Post-earthquake access to 
family planning varied based on women’s proximity to donor agencies,68 and pregnant 
women faced specific challenges. Immediately following the earthquake, UNFPA estimated 
that 15 percent of the 63,000 pregnant women in affected areas were likely to experience 
potentially life-threatening complications; many women reportedly gave birth in the street, 
as most medical facilities were focusing on emergency care for those who had been injured 
                                                
61 Kimberly A. Cullen and Louise C. Ivers, “Human Rights Assessment in Parc Jean Marie Vincent, Port-au-Prince, Haiti,” 
Health and Human Rights in Practice 12, no. 2 (2010): 66.  
62 Dalberg Global Advisors, Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement, (Washington, DC: Dalberg 
Global Advisors, 2010): 6, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf. 
63 Ibid. 
64 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Driven by Desperation: Transactional Sex as a Survival Strategy in Port-
au-Prince IDP Camps (Port-au-Prince: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, May 2011), 
http://www.urd.org/IMG/pdf/SGBV-UNHCR-report2_FINAL.pdf.  
65 Ibid. 
66 Dalberg Global Advisors, Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement, (Washington, DC: Dalberg 
Global Advisors, 2010): 93, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.  
67 2010 Haiti Equality Collective, The Gender Shadow Report: Ensuring Haitian Women’s Participation and Leadership in All 
Stages of National Relief and Reconstruction, (Haiti: Collectif Haïti Égalité, 2010), 
http://www.genderaction.org/publications/2010/gsr.pdf. 
68 Dalberg Global Advisors, Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement, (Washington, DC: Dalberg 
Global Advisors, 2010): 78, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf. 
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during the earthquake.69 7,000 HIV-positive women were pregnant at the time of the 
earthquake, and ensuring continued access to treatment in order to reduce mother-to-child 
transmission was a key challenge in post-earthquake Haiti. Haitian health officials and 
international organizations warned that new HIV infections may have risen given the 
increased levels of transactional sex and sexual assaults.70  
 
Financial Stability 
 
According to the PDNA, the earthquake caused a total of $7.8 billion in damages and losses, 
amounting to 120 percent of Haiti’s 2009 GDP. A 2010 USAID-funded survey of almost 
1,000 farmers in rural, earthquake-impacted areas suggests that survey participants saw 
between a 90 and 92 percent drop in petty commerce in the two to three months after the 
earthquake. This has a tremendous impact on already-vulnerable groups such as women-
led households, particularly because women often work in the informal sector in commerce, 
selling goods in markets.71 For those women who were able to work, childcare and safe 
transportation were not always available.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
69 Ibid, 81. 
70 Ibid, 87.  
71 Ibid, 108. 
72 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Driven by Desperation: Transactional Sex as a Survival Strategy in Port-
au-Prince IDP Camps (Port-au-Prince: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, May 2011): 113, 
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VI. Earthquake Response and Gender Mainstreaming Policy  
 
OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID have different mandates and capabilities, and thus 
responded to the 2010 earthquake in different ways. OCHA and UNHCR responded 
primarily to immediate needs, focusing on protection and security concerns, though 
UNHCR played only an advisory role in the protection cluster. UNEP played a modest role 
in emergency relief, but provided strong gender-responsive programming for prevention 
and resilience for future disasters. USAID responded both to immediate concerns and long-
term capacity-building needs, transitioning from a strong focus on protection and GBV to a 
focus on resilience and DRR. All four organizations were guided by internal gender 
mainstreaming policies, though these policies varied in terms of the degree of institutional 
rigidity in the application of the policy, the emphasis on accountability mechanisms, and 
incorporation of these policies in daily staff tasks. This difference in institutional attitude 
influenced the differentiated response and incorporation of gender considerations in the 
programming of each of these organizations.  
 
OCHA 
 
OCHA is the UN agency responsible for ensuring a coherent response to emergencies and 
mobilizing and coordinating humanitarian action. This involves creating a framework that 
facilitates the cooperation and coordination of humanitarian organizations, with an 
emphasis on preparedness and prevention, creating sustainable solutions, and advocating 
for the rights of people in need.73 OCHA’s role in Haiti was the organization of resources 
and programming to help ensure a smooth and effective response. OCHA was heavily 
involved in Haiti immediately following the earthquake, and managed several funds74 that 
supported humanitarian response following the earthquake. The organization played a 
major role by coordinating and publishing appeals for funding, which delineated needs and 
funding requests according to cluster75 and according to responding organization. OCHA’s 
                                                
73 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Who We Are,” accessed February 10, 2016, 
http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are.  
74 OCHA hosts two types of funding mechanisms: the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), and 
country-based pooled funds (CBPFs). CERF is made up of pooled contributions from donors that is set aside for immediate use 
at the onset of emergencies, in rapidly deteriorating situations, and in protracted crises that fail to attract sufficient 
resources. CBPFs are multi-donor humanitarian financing instruments that allocate funding based on identified 
humanitarian needs and priorities at the country level. A particular type of CBPF, the Haiti Emergency Relief Response Fund 
(ERRF Haiti) was established in 2008 and provided rapid and flexible funding to in-country actors to address urgent and 
unforeseen humanitarian needs in Haiti. (See: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Who We 
Are,” accessed February 10, 2016, http://www.unocha.org/about-us/who-we-are; United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, “Country-Based Pooled Funds,” accessed February 10, 2016, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-
do/humanitarian-financing/country-based-pooled-funds; United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
“Emergency Relief Response Fund,” accessed February 10, 2016, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/haiti/emergency-relief-response-fund-errf).  
75 Clusters are groups of humanitarian organizations working in the main sector of humanitarian action, such as camp 
management, health, or protection. The clusters are used when actors within sectors and national authorities need 
coordination support. OCHA works closely with global cluster lead agencies to develop policies, coordinate inter-cluster issues, 
and disseminate operational guidance. (See: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Cluster 
Coordination,” accessed February 10, 2016 http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/cluster-coordination).  
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response in Haiti was primarily within the realm of disaster response, only the first stage of 
DRR programming, and it focused on protection of vulnerable populations and traditional 
security concerns in the short-term. While gender was integrated into parts of the response, 
especially in the objectives and outcomes described in the Flash Appeal, other areas, such 
as collection of sex-disaggregated data and coordination of protection and resilience 
activities, proved more difficult because OCHA had to rely on partner organizations for 
data and distribution of resources on the ground. OCHA’s response is characterized by a 
divide between the external-facing activities, which incorporated gender relatively 
successfully, and internal processes, in which inclusion of gender was more challenging.  
 
OCHA’s work during the response was guided by its 2005 Gender Equality Policy (GEP). 
The GEP emphasizes OCHA’s goal of gender equality, which is a responsibility shared 
among all staff, from the Senior Management Team to managers and advocacy staff. The 
GEP encompasses gender mainstreaming, empowerment of women and girls, prevention 
and response to GBV, protection from sexual exploitation and abuse by humanitarian 
personnel, gender balance, and advocacy on behalf of a human rights-based approach.76 The 
GEP states: 
 
• OCHA will work to ensure that humanitarian assistance recognizes and 
responds to the protection and assistance needs of women and girls, as well 
as men and women. Through its coordination role, it will identify gaps 
relating to gender issues and call upon the humanitarian community to 
develop strategies to fill these gaps.  
• OCHA will strengthen gender analysis in humanitarian assistance and 
support the humanitarian community’s analysis of gender dimensions thus 
contributing to an improved understanding of emergencies, recovery and 
rehabilitation.  
• OCHA will play a leadership role in ensuring that all policy initiatives strive 
towards the goal of gender equality and incorporate a gender perspective.  
• OCHA representatives will speak out for the rights of women and girls, 
including their equitable participation in emergency and reconstruction 
initiatives.77 
 
While the GEP is, in theory, a comprehensive gender mainstreaming policy, its goals are 
ambiguous and difficult to translate into direct action. This aligns with a review of the GEP 
by OCHA’s Evaluation and Guidance Section in 2010, which posited that knowledge of the 
GEP within OCHA was limited and that a majority of the staff did not see gender as a 
priority for OCHA’s Senior Management and administration. Staff felts that management 
did not provide the necessary leadership or resources to fully implement the GEP. The 
                                                
76 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Evaluation and Guidance Section, “Review of OCHA’s 
Gender Equality Policy,” (December 2010): 4-6, 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GEP_Review_FinalReport_Adobe.pdf.  
77 Ibid, 6-7. 
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review also found that gender mainstreaming was often a second priority at the field level 
due to overextended staff and the lack of skills and knowledge about how to mainstream 
gender effectively.78 OCHA’s coordinating efforts show mixed results; OCHA put resources 
and political support behind certain initiatives emphasizing gender equality, such as the 
Gender Capacity Standby Project (GenCap)79 and the GBV sub-cluster,80 but struggled to 
create truly gender mainstreamed programming through its partner organizations, as 
OCHA had little ability to ensure that responding organizations used a gender-responsive 
framework or collected sex-disaggregated data. 
 
OCHA achieved several successes in their response: the United Nations Disaster 
Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC)81 team arrived in Haiti within 24 hours of the 
earthquake; the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and Flash Appeal82 were 
prepared very quickly, and funding began pouring in. Gender was included in the Flash 
Appeal, most specifically in the Protection cluster. The Appeal used gender-sensitive 
language, 83 and gender was, in theory, considered a cross-cutting issue. The designation for 
some projects included in the Appeal included objectives and outcomes specifically related 
to inclusion and participation of women.84 For example, the Early Recovery section of the 
2010 Flash Appeal specifically states a goal of gender balance in the creation of 
employment opportunities.85 One staff member noted that “gender is a key component” in 
the Appeal.86 The 2010 Flash Appeal states, “A gender focus forms one of the main criteria 
for the selection of beneficiaries.”87 However, it should be noted that the Flash Appeal 
focuses primarily on prevention of GBV rather than inclusion of women in long-term 
recovery activities. The Flash Appeal also included sex- and age-disaggregated data for the 
                                                
78 Ibid, 4.  
79 The Gender Standby Capacity Project (GenCap) is a program within the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) created 
in collaboration with the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) that supports the development and implementation of gender-
sensitive programming to humanitarian organizations at global, regional, and country levels. GenCap advisors are deployed to 
support the Humanitarian Coordinator, Humanitarian Country Teams, UN agencies, cluster leads, NGOs, and governments. 
(See: “GenCap –the IASC Gender Standby Capacity Project,” Humanitarian Response, accessed February 9, 2016, 
https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/coordination/gencap).   
80 The GBV sub-cluster operates within the protection cluster in OCHA’s cluster system and focuses on prevention of GBV and 
support for survivors of GBV. For a full description of the cluster system, see footnote 74.   
81 The United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team is part of the international emergency response 
system for sudden-onset emergencies. UNDAC teams can deploy at short notice and are mandated to complete assessment, 
coordination, and information management. (See: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “What 
is UNDAC,” accessed February 8, 2016, http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination-tools/undac/overview).   
82 In humanitarian emergency situations requiring international assistance, OCHA issues a Flash Appeal that articulates 
humanitarian needs, priority sectors for response, an outline of response plans, and roles and responsibilities. (See: 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CERF/CERF_and_FA_20.11.08.pdf)  
83 A programming process is gender sensitive when the gender dimension is systematically integrated into every step of the 
process, from defining the problem, to identifying potential solutions, in the methodology and approach to implementing the 
project, in stakeholders analysis and the choice of partners, in defining the objective, outcomes, outputs, and activities, in the 
composition of the implementation and management team, in budgeting, in the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) process, 
and in policy dialogue. (See Brigitte Leduc and Farid Ahmad, “Guidelines for Gender Sensitive Programming,” International 
Centre for Integrated Mountain Development, (November 2009): 1, http://www.icimod.org).  
84 Interview, 7 Dec 2015.  
85 United Nations, Haiti Earthquake Flash Appeal, United Nations, (16 Jan 2010): 29, 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/CAP/Flash_2010_Haiti_SCREEN.pdf.  
86 Interview, 15 Dec 2015b.  
87 Ibid, 84. 
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affected population.88 Cluster coordination was done rapidly, and resources, both financial 
and human, were mobilized very quickly.89  
 
However, the distinction between the emphasis on gender in the Flash Appeal and the 
realities of implementation was stark. The response suffered from weak humanitarian 
leadership, lack of local ownership, difficulty in preparing for and responding to an urban 
disaster, and weak needs assessments.90 Staff overwhelmingly cited the difficult pre-
existing situation in Haiti – whether the lack of governance, local security, or urban 
planning – as significant challenges to providing effective, gender-responsive assistance.91 A 
lack of preparedness at OCHA for response in an urban area was also cited as a serious 
obstacle,92 and an April 2010 evaluation of the cluster system’s activities in Haiti noted that 
existing guidance often did not consider urban disaster settings.93 
 
Transitioning from the appeal and funding process, OCHA made efforts to ensure that 
gender was mainstreamed into each cluster. OCHA hosted two particularly innovative 
responses to address gender inequality and vulnerability in the emergency response: the 
PSEA94 mechanism and the GenCap initiative.95 These positions were supported by staff at 
the highest levels, which ensured that advocates for a gender-inclusive response had a seat 
at the table.96 The Emergency Coordinator provided support for the PSEA, and the Deputy 
Humanitarian Coordinator’s support for the inclusion of gender in the inter-cluster 
coordination meetings was crucial for a gender-responsive response. OCHA also deployed a 
Senior Policy Officer in Gender Equality to support the GenCap advisor in mainstreaming 
gender issues into the clusters. The GenCap advisor initially assisted the GBV sub-cluster 
in ensuring that GBV was taken into account in the planning process. The GBV sub-cluster 
and the Gender in the Humanitarian Response Working Group97 advocated for lighting and 
increased access to food, shelters, and separate sanitation facilities, especially those with 
lockable doors, for women and girls. The staff in the GBV sub-cluster made special efforts to 
extend GBV prevention to programming across other clusters as well, working extensively 
with the Camp Management cluster.98 The GenCap advisor then focused on the Inter-
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Cluster Coordination Group (ICCG)99 to provide technical support and guidance, which 
then facilitated training for assessment teams and cluster leads on entry points for 
addressing women’s needs.100  
 
However, few training tools related to GBV or women’s needs more broadly were developed 
and disseminated to the humanitarian community focusing on a gender-inclusive response 
during the emergency response phase. This was a prevalent issue across actors during the 
response. The 2010 evaluation of the cluster system noted that while the cluster system 
improved information sharing, information management remained weak, and information 
was often lost or not shared in a timely manner.101 Advocacy for prevention of GBV or 
separate sanitation facilities was difficult in many of the sectors, as gender-inclusive 
response was not as strongly mandated in programming outside of the GBV sub-cluster and 
Protection cluster.102 The PSEA coordinator was deployed in early April 2010, but the 
mechanism dissipated after the first coordinator left.103 An evaluation of the OCHA 
emergency response to the Haiti earthquake found that “lack of continuity of…[gender] 
initiatives beyond the first three months has negated what could otherwise have been 
achieved.”104  
 
A high rate of staff turnover led to nearly nonexistent institutional memory; losing 
momentum, the original gender initiatives dissolved, alongside an understanding of the 
importance of integrating gender into disaster response. A field staff member in Haiti noted 
in a 2012 evaluation, “we have so many other problems to deal with, we haven’t even 
started to think about gender.”105  These other problems included overextended resources 
and agencies,106 language barriers that kept local organizations from convening with 
international actors, and the lack of capacity from the local government to assist in the 
recovery.107   
 
While the Appeal and coordination of the cluster system emphasized the inclusion of 
women, gender mainstreaming in programming proved more difficult. Per OCHA’s 
mandate as a coordinating organization, day-to-day implementation relied heavily on 
partners, who had differing capacities and commitments to collecting sex-disaggregated 
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data or including women in needs assessments.108 The collection of gender-disaggregated 
data to inform the design and implementation of programming was a significant challenge 
during the response, and OCHA’s policy was not strong enough to ensure that partners 
incorporated a gender lens in their work.109 Staff at both senior and mid-levels in OCHA 
and UNDAC emphasized the difficulty in ensuring that data from partners would be 
disaggregated by sex and would include women’s perspectives.110  
 
Another serious challenge to effective gender mainstreaming was the muddled 
understanding of the responsibilities of GenCap advisors compared to gender focal points 
within OCHA. Staff often spoke about these advisors and focal points interchangeably, 
though gender focal points work internally within OCHA, and GenCap advisors are 
assigned within the broader cluster system. Staff at senior and mid-level positions showed 
a disparity in the extent to which they worked with any kind of gender advisor, either 
internal OCHA gender focal points or GenCap advisors. Senior level staff tended to have a 
clearer relationship with gender focal points and to consult with them more regularly.111 
The confusion about the distinction between gender focal points and GenCap advisors is 
characteristic of the external-internal duality at OCHA; while GenCap advisors are part of 
an external initiative and gender focal points work internally within OCHA, the two are 
intertwined in coordination and programming, as OCHA works with partner organizations 
and seeks to provide a framework for the cluster system. Ultimately, the muddled 
institutional structure made it difficult for staff to access resources on gender 
mainstreaming and gender-responsive approaches on a regular and routinized basis.  
 
OCHA’s work largely centered on immediate response rather than long-term resilience or 
capacity-building. OCHA and its partners struggled with the disparity between short-term 
financial and staff commitment and the long-term needs of the Haitian population. The 
focus on immediate life-saving response precluded real action on what survivors would need 
in the future, particularly economic opportunities and empowerment. One staff member 
described the issue facing the response teams, “How do you build anything sustainable 
when people are struggling for survival?”112 This difficulty manifested as a priority on 
protection, but not as much on economic revitalization or the rebuilding of markets and 
businesses, which are vital for real recovery. One staff member argued, “As far as I know, 
what we did definitely strongly was the protection element […] because that is, from the 
very beginning, an issue which is very much related to women and children. Because if they 
don’t have the proper protection, they can become particularly vulnerable.”113 This same 
staff member recognized the importance of including women in the revitalization of the 
economy, saying,  
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“And then also when it comes to the Early Recovery, I do recall that, too, women are 
also those who do, from the very beginning, kind of manage to get this small 
economy running, it’s often, very often women, so this is often an element where 
they need to be supported. This was done to at least a limited degree successfully in 
the Haiti response…If they get the proper support, they are kind of bringing this 
small economy running, these little stands.”114  
However, this type of response remained largely outside the capacity and scope of OCHA’s 
response. 
 
OCHA achieved several successes in its response to the earthquake; its rapid response and 
mobilization of funding and staff is laudable, as is its support for GenCap advisors and the 
inclusion of GBV sub-cluster staff in coordination meetings. However, the institutional 
structure of OCHA seemed to obscure the resources and responsibilities meant for true 
mainstreaming in implementation. Ultimately, OCHA’s role as a coordinating agency and 
its heavy reliance on partners for data and daily implementation seriously limited its 
ability to use sex-disaggregated data or guide programming according to gendered needs.  
 
UNHCR 
 
UNHCR is the UN agency that leads and coordinates international action to protect the 
rights and well-being of refugees. UNHCR’s role was limited in the response to the Haiti 
earthquake, and focused on providing support to the overall UN cluster system and to other 
organizations. Unlike in a conventional emergency response operation, where UNHCR is 
the lead agency in providing protection and assistance to the host government and to 
refugees, in Haiti the agency took on a mainly advisory role.115 Although it often has the 
lead role in overseeing the protection and shelter needs of internally displaced persons, 
UNHCR’s mandate does not specifically include IDPs. Additionally, it did not have a 
physical presence in Haiti at the time of the earthquake, instead working on Haitian issues 
through a regional office based out of Washington D.C.116 Thus, other organizations that 
were more established in Haiti, such as the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Children’s Fund 
(UNICEF), became primary leads for the protection and camp management and 
coordination clusters, which are conventional responsibilities of UNHCR. This decision was 
in line with the standards of the Cluster Approach for natural disaster situations, which 
allows for the three agencies to pick the lead agency in a natural disaster setting on case-
by-case basis.117 While UNHCR was able to provide input on women’s specific 
                                                
114 Interview, 29 Dec 2015.  
115 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Coordinating Assistance,” accessed February 10, 2016, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/538dd3da6.html.  
116 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Internally Displaced People,” accessed February 10, 2016, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c146.html.  
117 Interview, 8 Jan 2016. (See also United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Climate change, natural disasters and 
human displacement: a UNCHR perspective, accessed February 10, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/4901e81a4.html).   
 34 
vulnerabilities as IDPs, its limited role and lack of policies for natural disasters yielded a 
limited application of its gender mainstreaming policies in the Haiti emergency response.  
 
Prior to its efforts in Haiti, UNHCR had strong but uneven policies on gender 
mainstreaming in natural disaster settings. In a textual analysis of UNHCR documents, 24 
explicitly referenced gender, but only four specifically included or called for sex-
disaggregated data. The agency published its first Environmental Guidelines in 1996; an 
updated version in 2005 uses gender-inclusive language, references women’s specific needs 
and capabilities, calls for women and girls to be involved in environmental stewardship, 
and acknowledges the differential impact of the environment on men and women.118 Around 
the same time, from 2004 to 2007, the agency’s Age, Gender, and Diversity Mainstreaming 
(AGDM) strategy was rolled out, reconceiving UNHCR’s protection mandate to include 
cross-cutting social, political, and economic dimensions, such as gender.119 This was a very 
innovative strategy for UNHCR, which actively called for mainstreaming gender and not 
merely including it. The AGDM strategy, although not mandatory, included an 
accountability framework to establish minimum standards, such as collecting sex-
disaggregated data in assessments and evaluations.120 As part of the overall review of 
gender policies, the 2008 UNHCR Handbook for the Protection of Women and Girls 
considers the specific protection challenges for women and girls, and provides concrete 
strategies for field and headquarters staff to implement to confront these challenges.121 
Despite these guidelines for mainstreaming gender in policy and practice, disaster risk 
reduction policies reflected limited gender concerns. The major UNHCR report on climate 
change, natural disasters, and human displacement – the first such UNHCR publication 
and released in 2009 – made no mention of gender-responsive policies and procedures.122   
 
In the aftermath of the earthquake, staff priorities reflected UNHCR’s emphasis on the 
overarching principles on gender mainstreaming policies. There was a clear understanding 
among UNHCR staff, both at headquarters and in the field, that women’s needs are an 
inherent part of UNHCR’s protection mission.123 In one staff member’s perspective, 
referring to existing programming protocols, “If I am a protection officer and don’t include 
gender, I have nothing to do in UNHCR.”124  
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Gender was mostly considered within the context of women’s vulnerability to gender-based 
violence (GBV).125 Following Handbook guidelines on coordinating work with local women’s 
groups and associations, UNHCR staff targeted reports of GBV by partnering with The 
Commission of Women Victims for Victims (KOFAVIV), a local women’s organization that 
works to prevent sexual violence and provides material and psychological support for 
survivors. KOFAVIV sent monitors into camps to compile information on the status of 
women, with UNHCR protection officers meeting weekly with the monitors to discuss 
cases.126 UNHCR staff also eventually set up a call center with KOFAVIV, which women 
could call to access services or request a monitor to accompany them to a clinic.127 UNHCR 
also funded multiple safe houses and shelters for GBV survivors among the IDP population; 
it funded one shelter in 2010, opened one safe house and one shelter in 2011, and opened a 
safe house in 2012 through the French Red Cross.128  
 
While these actions demonstrate UNHCR’s strong overall understanding of the role of 
gender in protection response, the lack of specific protocols for gender mainstreaming in 
natural disasters contributed to limited success in responding to women’s needs in post-
disaster Haiti. Protocols and policies that UNHCR had in place for other emergency 
contexts were not followed in the disaster response. For instance, multiple guidelines and 
handbooks discuss the intentional mapping of latrines and lighting in camps to prevent 
GBV.129 Yet, more than one month after the earthquake, there was little to no adequate 
lighting near WASH facilities in camps, no mapping of GBV service providers, limited 
mixed-gender patrols in IDP camps, and limited planning for safety around food 
distribution.130 UNHCR did respond to reports of GBV by later negotiating for lights near 
latrines and increasing protection monitors,131 but according to UNHCR’s own guidelines, 
these actions should have been taken much earlier during the initial assessment.132 Staff 
referred to the chaotic operating environment of post-disaster Haiti as a major barrier, 
given the lack of infrastructure and limited government capabilities.133 UNHCR’s policies 
were not well aligned to disaster response scenarios; thus, the agency’s extensive expertise 
was not well deployed.   
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Exacerbating the lack of gender mainstreaming in disaster-specific policies was the 
confusion of the agency’s role, given that UNHCR took an advisory approach to its actions 
in Haiti. While UNHCR’s guidelines are clear about lighting in camps, the agency served as 
a technical advisor, not the lead on the Protection cluster. One staff member mentioned the 
difficulties of “leading a cluster without the means to lead a cluster,” in trying to provide 
direction without holding the authority to truly do so.134  
 
The diffusion of responsibility in a chaotic environment limited UNHCR’s ability to respond 
to women’s needs. While the agency’s staff individually attempted to follow best practices of 
gender mainstreaming, such as consulting with local women’s organizations, these efforts 
were limited by the institution’s lack of specific disaster response policies and its narrow 
role in the response.   
 
UNEP 
 
UNEP is the leading global environmental authority that works on global environmental 
and sustainable development. With a presence in Haiti since 2009, a UNEP team was on 
the ground in Haiti when the earthquake struck on January 12, 2010. Temporarily halted 
by the destruction of their office and pressing personal needs, UNEP staff members were 
fully remobilized within three weeks.135 UNEP’s response focused on technical assistance 
and advice on environmental issues, with the agency serving as focal point for the cross-
cutting issue of environment in the IASC cluster system.136 Given the limited human 
resources in the immediate aftermath, individual UNEP staff members also led specific 
missions based on their previous expertise, such as carrying out building inspections and 
seismic risk assessments,137 even if these activities fell outside of UNEP’s core mandate138 
of coordinating environmental policies and programs. The technical assistance that UNEP 
provided was unsuccessful at holistically incorporating women’s needs in the emergency 
response, but UNEP’s continued work into the early recovery stages of the response 
included a strong understanding of women’s roles in resilience.  
 
Overall, UNEP took a four-pillared approach to its immediate response: awareness raising, 
coordination, technical assistance, and direct action.139 Awareness raising and coordination 
included conducting assessments and distributing among the many actors present in the 
humanitarian response. UNEP’s first contribution to the response was its Rapid 
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Environmental Assessment (REA),140 which was published on January 17, 2010 and is 
subsequently updated on a regular basis. The REAs identified the important environmental 
issues in the aftermath of the earthquake: including oil and chemical spills, fires, 
landslides, resource depletion from displaced populations, waste management, energy 
demands, and flood risks.141 The REA from January 27th details UNEP’s work within the 
cluster system, but has absolutely no reference to gender or gender analysis. Additionally, 
in the UNEP Haiti Mission Report from March 2010, the environmental overview of post-
earthquake Haiti limits gender considerations to one sentence regarding the shared WASH 
facilities of men and women.142  
 
The technical assistance and direct action undertaken by the agency also were not gender 
mainstreamed. Action steps were directed to waste management for medical waste, with no 
indication of gendered impacts.143 Technical assistance similarly had practically 
nonexistent gender analysis, but did mention UNEP’s technical support to WFP’s Cash for 
Work program, which was particularly targeted to women and other vulnerable 
populations.144 One of UNEP’s key recommendations to the program was to develop more 
inclusive structures for sustainable management of resources,145 a recommendation aligned 
with UNEP’s policies on gender mainstreaming practices.  
 
Despite the response, there was a long precedent of UNEP protocols that emphasized 
gender mainstreaming and the environment. In 1985, UNEP held a session on women and 
the environment during the Third World Conference on Women in Nairobi, Kenya. Since 
then, multiple sessions of the Governing Council of UNEP have stressed the role of women 
in the work of the agency. The 2004-2005 work plan of the agency included gender as a 
cross-cutting priority;146 in 2005, the agency contracted consultants to assess the status of 
gender mainstreaming in UNEP’s Division of Early Warning and Assessment;147 by 2006, 
UNEP had a detailed Gender Plan of Action with targets and timelines for instituting 
gender mainstreaming.148 The continued steps suggest a commitment by senior leadership 
to significantly incorporating gender mainstreaming into the agency’s mission, and UNEP 
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staff reaffirm an institutional recognition of women as an integral part of UNEP’s 
mission.149   
 
Most of UNEP’s policies on gender mainstreaming focused on the gendered dimensions of 
environmental stewardship and sustainability. The strong policies on gender 
mainstreaming before 2010 emphasized the links among gender, poverty reduction, and 
post-conflict settings, but had less specific protocols on gender considerations in natural 
disaster scenarios. However, two years before the earthquake in Haiti, UNEP produced a 
guide on conducting post-disaster environmental needs assessments that uses gender 
inclusive language throughout, discusses men and women’s differentiated resource use and 
livelihood strategies, and recommends sex-disaggregated data.150 While the 2010 Global 
Environmental Outlook (GEO) report on Haiti has some sex-disaggregated data and 
mentions gender in multiple places throughout the report, it falls far short of fulfilling the 
very specific recommendations of a 2005 review on how to better mainstream gender in 
GEO reports.151  
 
It was therefore contrary to UNEP’s existing gender mainstreaming guidelines when 
gender was not integrated into environmental assessments in Haiti. In a textual analysis of 
twelve UNEP Haiti country reports and risk assessments, eight did not contain sex-
disaggregated data. There was a similar disconnect between rhetoric and action among 
UNEP staff, who spoke at length about the importance of the required gender analysis, but 
did not acknowledge or were not aware that sex-disaggregated data and an analysis of 
women’s needs, vulnerabilities, and strengths had not been fully carried out.152 Staff did 
acknowledge some constraints of the response, particularly the challenge of prioritization. 
The failure to operationalize gender mainstreaming aligns with findings from a later UNEP 
internal evaluation that reviewed the agency’s protocols. The evaluation found that, despite 
the development of institutional mechanisms, the integration of gender mainstreaming at 
UNEP was curtailed by low levels of resource allocation and low awareness among staff of 
the Gender Plan of Action.153 As one staff member noted concerning the Haiti response, 
“You never had the budget plan that you thought you had when you start, in the 
earthquake.”154 Given that resource allocation at UNEP is tied to programs, funding 
processes were ill-suited to implement initiatives on cross-cutting issues such as gender.  
One member of the UNEP team noted that both gender and the environment were 
considered cross-cutting issues in the cluster system, and not included as among the life-
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saving priorities among the other clusters.155 At the cluster level, funding was also not 
available, with the environmental cluster often underfunded.156  
 
Despite the breakdown between UNEP’s gender mainstreaming protocols and agency action 
in emergency response, the agency’s post-disaster recovery work has focused on women’s 
capabilities for resilience. Post-disaster recovery projects included tackling food security 
issues by working with women's organizations to increase grain storage, as well as 
economic revitalization programs that emphasize two women-driven value chains.157 
Projects were created while considering the gender of its beneficiaries.158 One staff member 
noted, “We’re more focused at looking at opportunities to integrate women into the 
environmental and natural resources...much more from an economic perspective, and less 
so from the perspective of protection [or] security.”159 As UNEP’s work moved into the 
recovery stage of its post-disaster response, they were much more adept at mainstreaming 
gender into their programs. In the non-emergency situation, UNEP’s protocols on gender 
mainstreaming were operationalized with real success. 
 
USAID 
 
USAID is a U.S. government agency that works to end poverty and build resilient, 
democratic societies. USAID’s response in Haiti included both immediate disaster relief and 
long-term economic recovery and DRR programming. USAID’s response incorporated 
institutional guidelines and requirements for the inclusion of women’s needs and 
capabilities, and the Agency’s response focused on the transition between immediate 
disaster response and long-term recovery. However, USAID’s early response in Haiti, 
limited by the scale of devastation in Haiti and lack of preparation for an urban disaster, 
focused on women almost exclusively through the lens of GBV. USAID’s emergency 
response and long-term recovery programming differ in their incorporation of women’s 
needs and voices; during the emergency response, collection of sex-disaggregated data and 
inclusion of women in all levels of program design and implementation were a challenge, 
but long-term programming focused on economic recovery and DRR have been able to 
include women to a greater extent. Institutionally, USAID has created a strong 
infrastructure for the inclusion of women’s voices.  
 
During the course of this study, interviews were conducted with staff within the Office of 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Office of the Response Coordinator (ORC). 
However, these are not the only two offices within USAID that responded to the earthquake 
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156 Sun Mountain International and CHF International, Rapid Environmental Impact Assessment: Haiti Earthquake – 
January 12, 2010, United States Agency for International Development, (March 2010), 
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnads052.pdf.   
157 Interview, 15 Dec 2015b. 
158 Interview, 15 Dec 2015b. 
159 Interview, 15 Dec 2015b. 
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or have worked on gender concerns and DRR initiatives in Haiti. USAID was placed in 
charge of the U.S. government’s response to Haiti, and offices within USAID worked in 
close partnership with the U.S. military and Department of State, as well as international 
organizations. 160 For the scope of this project, OFDA and ORC were chosen because they 
were in charge of the majority of the emergency response as well as the transition into long-
term DRR programming. While many offices within USAID were heavily involved in the 
response to the earthquake and long-term rebuilding, OFDA and ORC were well-positioned 
to provide a coherent view of the USAID response.  
 
USAID had relatively strong guidelines and requirements related to gender equality in 
place before the earthquake hit Haiti. The first of these was a cross-sector 1982 policy paper 
on women in development, which demonstrates how “LDC161 women’s concerns” are to be 
integrated into USAID programming. This paper acknowledged the variety of unique 
challenges and opportunities that women encounter, and called for the entire agency to 
commit to implementing gender considerations in projects and programs. The policy 
recognizes the productivity of women and the obstacles that prevent their effective access to 
productive work, particularly lack of education and training. The policy calls for sex-
disaggregated data collection, as well as the development of institutions and transfer of 
technology, to ensure the inclusion of women.162  
 
The 1996 Gender Plan of Action (GPA)163 included requirements for gender integration in 
policy, personnel, procurement, performance monitoring, and evaluation. An evaluation of 
the GPA in 2000 by the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Assistance (ACVFA)164 
found several obstacles to the effective institutionalization of the GPA, including large 
budget cuts in combination with expanding budget earmarks, disruptions caused by 
reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance agencies, low levels of consultation and 
communication about the GPA with USAID staff, and concern of proliferation of USAID 
priorities. In 2009, USAID revised its Automated Directives System (ADS),165 which 
contains USAID’s policy directives and mandatory procedures, to provide a more detailed 
integration approach. Gender analysis is one of two mandatory analysis requirements that 
                                                
160 Interviews, 12 Jan 2016b, 30 Jan 2016.  
161 Least Developed Countries. 
162 United States Agency for International Development, Women in Development, A.I.D. Policy Paper, (October 1982): 1-2, 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/womendev.pdf.  
163 United States Agency for International Development, Gender Action Plan (1996), quoted in United States Agency for 
International Development, Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, (Washington, DC: United States Agency for 
International Development, March 2012): 4, 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/GenderEqualityPolicy_0.pdf. (See also: United States Agency for 
International Development, “Gender Plan of Action,” in CIB 99-13 Evaluating Gender Issues in Competitive Negotiated 
Solicitations, (March 1996), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1868/cib9913.pdf).  
164 For more information, see: ACVFA, “Strategies for Gender Equality in International Development,” (presentation, ACVFA 
Quarterly Meeting, May, 2010): 10-16, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacj877.pdf.   
165 For details of the update to ADS 201 and 203, see: United States Agency for International Development, Guide to Gender 
Integration and Analysis: Additional Help for ADS Chapters 201 and 203, (March 2010), 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/201sab.pdf.   
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are must be integrated into strategic planning, project design and approval, procurement 
processes, and measurement and evaluation.166  
 
Yet USAID’s actions in Haiti largely do not reflect this early recognition of the importance 
of gender mainstreaming. A series of USAID fact sheets on the Haiti earthquake that were 
published demonstrate limited awareness of men and women’s different experiences in 
disasters. An examination of 73 fact sheets about the earthquake released in fiscal year 
2010 shows that 41 of these explicitly reference women or gender. 14 of these fact sheets 
discuss GBV, and 18 discuss issues related to maternal care, breastfeeding, or pregnancy. 
Only 18 fact sheets discuss women in relation to cash-for-work programs, cash transfers, 
livelihood support, sanitation needs, or participation in security brigades. When women are 
mentioned as having distinct needs, it is usually related to GBV in the IDP camps. A March 
2010 rapid environmental assessment provides no information on gender and no sex-
disaggregated data. These early reports show a clear gap in USAID’s evaluations of the 
situation on the ground not including women or gender considerations. 
 
USAID’s immediate response to the earthquake focused heavily on protection of individuals 
living in camps.167 One staff member said that OFDA has a long history of experience 
dealing with issues that women commonly experience in camps, noting, “So over time, 
there’s been an evolution of best practice….in camps, where you put latrines, how do you 
light it up to make it safer for women. Collecting firewood, you have people go with them, 
you know, because sometimes women get raped when they go out too far from the camp. 
Safe spaces for women and kids, a whole host of things that you think about.”168 In the 
early response, women were rarely addressed or included in programming outside of GBV-
related funding and assistance. USAID worked closely with the U.S. military and local 
police to provide security in the camps, and direction was given from high-level leadership 
in the Department of State to prioritize protection of women. This guidance was described 
as constant and direct, placing high priority on the protection of women.169 The response in 
camps focused on lighting, especially around sanitation facilities for women. One staff 
member said,  
“So one of the things we did was, we brought in these mobile lights, huge lights to 
light up whole place. The irony was that, of course, there wasn’t light anywhere else, 
they just have the light in the camp. So we had lights, and we put more lights near 
where women, the female latrines were, we began to try to get more flashlights for 
people so they could navigate through the camps, and we did everything we could to 
kind light it up and make it safer.”170  
                                                
166 United States Agency for International Development, Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, (Washington, 
DC: United States Agency for International Development, March 2012): 4, 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/GenderEqualityPolicy_0.pdf. 
167 Interviews, 8 Dec 2015, 11 Dec 2015a, 12 Jan 2016b, 30 Jan 2016. 
168 Interview, 8 Dec 2015.  
169 Interviews, 8 Dec 2015, 12 Jan 2016b.  
170 Interview, 8 Dec 2015.  
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An effort was made to station police officers, especially women police officers, in the camps, 
and USAID prioritized the installation of lighting around sanitation facilities.171 However, 
these initiatives did not eliminate the GBV perpetrated in the camps. 
 
Staff cited the urban nature of the crisis as a serious challenge to effective response.172 They 
also argued that lack of local governance and security forces were significant obstacles.173 
One staff member explained, “I think what’s very distinctive about Haiti is it was an urban 
disaster with sort of a…rural response, in the sense of we set up camps.”174 It was very 
difficult to control entry and exit in these camps, exacerbating the security situation. The 
same staff member noted, “It had an urban disaster where communities were by and large 
just completely shattered, so whatever protective mechanism you had in your 
neighborhood…that you might have worked on, that was pretty gone.”175 U.S. government 
staff were killed in the earthquake, and this made rapid response more difficult.176 At that 
time, the response to the earthquake was also one of the biggest emergency responses that 
USAID had ever directed, and staff discussed the difficulty in mobilizing enough well-
qualified staff.177  
 
Additionally, collection of sex-disaggregated data to inform a sex-disaggregated response 
was challenging, and there were disparities about how frequently gender advisors were 
involved in the response. There are also disparities related to the inclusion of gender in 
reporting mechanisms. While some staff members remembered receiving specific gender 
mainstreaming training, others were unsure. However, staff members were clear that 
gender considerations were perceived as an integral part of the emergency response – a  
rhetorical gap between institutional policy and action.178  
 
While USAID’s initial response did not make use of the Agency’s extensive experience and 
protocols for addressing gendered needs, the institutional understanding of the importance 
of gender analysis led to the creation of long-term priorities that included women’s needs 
and abilities. One staff member said, “We realized we had to get more of our own office 
focused on transition. So much focus on today and tomorrow. We tried to bring a transition 
focus to everything we did.”179 The “Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy 
Statement” produced by Dalberg Global Advisors for USAID in September 2010 was 
intended to create a baseline gender analysis on social, economic, and legal phenomena in 
Haiti, and provide recommendations for inclusive policy priorities to inform USAID’s future 
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assistance in Haiti.180  This report recognizes not only women’s vulnerabilities but also their 
unique capabilities and agency in four sectors: infrastructure and energy, food and 
economic security, health and other basic services, and governance, rule of law, and 
security.  
 
 The U.S. government’s strategy for Haiti following the earthquake, Post-Earthquake USG 
Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity, published in January 2011, 
elucidated the U.S. government’s priorities during Haiti’s recovery process. The majority of 
references to women in the strategy lie within the realm of protection; the strategy largely 
deals with women as victims or potential victims of violence. However, this document also 
takes a long-term capacity-building perspective to build resilience. The strategy proposes a 
focus on households headed by single women in the construction of new homes, the 
reduction of the use of charcoal as a fuel and the subsequent reduction in negative health 
consequences for women, and strategies to empower Madam Saras, women traders who are 
a key link in the agricultural value chain. The strategy also expresses support for inclusion 
of women-owned businesses in the U.S. government’s procurement strategy.181 This 
strategy directed resources and created priorities for continued assistance in Haiti; 
USAID’s response turned toward long-term efforts to “build back better.”  
 
USAID staff members were clear that the consideration of women’s needs, vulnerabilities, 
and abilities should be included in the design and implementation of programming, and 
they were able to speak at length about specific challenges that Haitian women face. Staff 
members had detailed knowledge of the concept of gender mainstreaming and its relevance 
to their work, but this was not always translated into action in the early days of the 
response. However, in the period following the immediate rapid response, USAID created 
long-term strategies for inclusive and effective response in Haiti. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
180 Dalberg Global Advisors, Gender Assessment for USAID/Haiti Country Strategy Statement, (Washington, DC: Dalberg 
Global Advisors, 2010): v, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00K556.pdf.  
181United States Department of State, Post-Earthquake USG Haiti Strategy: Toward Renewal and Economic Opportunity 
(January 2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/156448.pdf.   
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VII. Changing Policies and Organizational Cultures 
 
The landscape of DRR and gender mainstreaming has improved in actionable and tangible 
ways at OCHA, UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID. While each organization has created its own 
unique policy suited for its unique mandate, each has more prominently promoted gender 
equality in its work and created stronger accountability mechanisms for gender 
mainstreaming. OCHA has significantly strengthened its policies since the Haiti response 
in 2010, and UNHCR has strengthened both its focus on gender and on DRR and climate 
change. UNEP has made commitments to mainstreaming through the creation of the 
Gender and Social Safeguard Unit and the Gender Marker, and USAID has continued to 
strengthen and refine its institutional focus on gender analysis and women’s empowerment. 
While challenges remain in responding to disasters and building long-term resilience, these 
organizations have taken significant steps to creating more inclusive programming, which 
will address the needs of women and men.  
 
OCHA 
 
OCHA has strengthened its policy and response procedures since its action during the Haiti 
crisis. The strengthening of gender focal points has also improved the understanding of 
gender mainstreaming and ability to implement gender-responsive techniques into 
programming within OCHA. OCHA staff perceive a significant improvement over time in 
the organization’s inclusion of women’s needs and abilities. 
 
OCHA’s policy on gender now delineates the specific procedures and tools to be integrated 
into daily tasks, making the requirements more concrete and providing clearer guidance for 
implementing the requirements. OCHA’s 2012-2015 Gender Equality Policy requires all 
staff to incorporate the “Seven Minimum Gender Commitments” into their work. This 
policy provides much more specific guidance than the previous policy, and it is notable that 
OCHA has made such a step to clarify the previously ambiguous language. The policy lists 
these commitments: 
 
OCHA staff will:  
1. Apply the ADAPT and ACT C Framework in all programming areas, 
ensuring, at a minimum, the following three elements are addressed, as they 
are fundamental to an effective humanitarian response:  
• Routine analysis of gender concerns to inform humanitarian 
programming and policy processes  
• Regular and timely collection and analysis of sex- and age-disaggregated data  
• Support to coordination of gender programming in the response  
 46 
2. Integrate gender issues into preparedness and resilience processes from data 
collection, assessments, planning, and capacity-building for national 
partners.  
3. Support the application of the IASC Gender Marker into OCHA-managed 
appeals and funding mechanisms.  
4. Ensure that monitoring and evaluation mechanisms can ascertain if the 
different needs of women, girls, boys, and men have been met in the 
humanitarian response. 
5. Develop communication and advocacy products that capture the different 
needs, capacities and voices of women, girls, boys, and men.  
6. Provide support to humanitarian country leadership, including cluster leads, 
to effectively integrate gender within humanitarian programming.  
7. Put in place necessary actions to protect women, girls, boys, and men from all 
forms of sexual exploitation and abuse by OCHA staff, in line with the 
Secretary-General’s bulletin on protection from sexual exploitation and 
abuse.182 
 
For the above policy, the ADAPT and ACT C Framework is a tool to help staff members 
take the larger concepts related to mainstreaming and turn them into actionable steps. The 
ADAPT and ACT C Framework helps project staff review their projects or actions using a 
gender equality lens. The framework promotes the active involvement of women and men 
and recognizes the multiple roles of women and men in post-crisis situations. The 
framework involves nine steps, which emphasize a complete gender analysis, participation 
and training of women and men, and use of sex- and age-disaggregated data.183 These are 
specific and actionable steps for staff at all levels to follow. Additionally, OCHA’s strategic 
plan for 2014 through 2017 emphasizes the importance of including women in the planning, 
consultation, and decision-making processes, with a particular focus on the inclusion of 
women’s organizations.184  
 
The approach seems to have been successful; staff expressed clear understandings of what 
gender mainstreaming means in policy and implementation. Contrary to the findings of the 
2010 evaluation of the impact of the GEP, staff at OCHA seem aware that gender 
mainstreaming is a priority and where to find resources to support mainstreaming. Staff at 
OCHA felt strongly that the organization has improved its gender mainstreaming ability, 
as well as its capacity to address women’s needs and hear women’s voices during emergency 
response.185 They cited both institutional change and also the impact of donors and the shift 
                                                
182 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Gender Equality: A People-Centred Approach, 
(December 2012), https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/PI%20-%20Gender%20Equality.pdf.  
183 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Gender Toolkit, Policy Development and 
Studies Branch (December 2012), https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/GenderToolkit1_9_PSEAandOCHA.pdf.  
184 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA Strategic Plan 2014-2017, (2013), 
https://docs.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/OCHA%20SF%202014-2017%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf.   
185 Interviews, 15 Dec 2015b, 21 Dec 2015a, 21 Dec 2015b, 29 Dec 2015.  
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in global dialogue about the inclusion of women at all levels of programming.186 OCHA also 
undertook a Participatory Gender Audit in 2014.187  
 
However, opportunities for improvement remain. Staff reported not receiving any kind of 
gender mainstreaming training, and this was common both among staff who had been with 
OCHA for many years or only for a few months.188 The collection of sex-disaggregated data 
is still a challenge, and offices lack the capacity to gather data independently of partners.189  
 
Additionally, OCHA staff members seem to be unclear about what the next steps should be 
to address these problems. The recommendations of the 2014 audit will be incorporated into 
operations, but there remains ambivalence about how change should happen in the 
organization. While several staff members cited external and donor pressure as a force to 
improve gender mainstreaming, one staff member voiced concerns that donor-driven 
change may not always be the answer, but that locally-driven approaches may be more 
appropriate. The staff member said, “Rather than communicating to donors in Norway that 
a budget has gender indicators, we should go out and work more with communities, 
understanding their requirements, then communicate to them why we are doing what we 
are doing.”190 This connects with a broader debate about integrating gender in policy and 
whether the impetus for change and guidance should come from organizational leadership 
and donors or from the people that these organizations serve. 
 
While it may be unclear what OCHA’s next step is for gender mainstreaming policy, it is 
clear that, within a short amount of time, the organization has made its policies and 
requirements more specific and more demanding. As a coordination agency working with 
many different international, national, and local actors, OCHA’s policy and institutional 
shifts may have a significant effect on making humanitarian response more inclusive. 
 
UNHCR 
 
UNHCR made significant progress in updating its policies and protocols to create a more 
inclusive version of its protection and assistance mission. The original perspective of the 
agency’s AGDM strategy has been strengthened and codified as UNHCR policy. UNHCR 
also is reconceiving its mission to include preventive and response strategies for mitigating 
the impacts of climate change. However, the progress in gender mainstreaming policies and 
disaster risk reduction policies remains unfortunately distinct, an approach that may 
continue to limit UNHCR’s ability to effectively respond to disaster scenarios. 
 
                                                
186 Interviews, 15 Dec 2015b, 21 Dec 2015a.  
187 Interview, 29 Dec 2015. (See also: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Gender Equality 
Programming,” accessed February 10, 2016, http://www.staging.unocha.org/about-us/gender-equality-programming).  
188 Interviews, 21 Dec 2015a, 21 Dec 2015b, 29 Dec 2015.  
189 Interviews, 21 Deb 2015b, 29 Dec 2015. 
190 Interview, 15 Dec 2015b. 
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In 2011, UNHCR updated its AGDM strategy, releasing a new Age, Gender and Diversity 
(AGD) policy.191 Whereas the original strategy simply provided guidelines for UNHCR staff, 
the AGD policy is meant to be systematically applied to all UNHCR operations worldwide. 
The policy not only identifies a set of core commitments, but also targets the six 
pathways192 for a successful integration of mainstreaming principles, such as accountability 
for senior level staff and the allocation of both human and financial resources. The agency 
also developed a detailed accountability framework, with a list of minimum standards,193 
which must be completed in conjunction with its Annual Programme Review requirements.  
 
UNHCR staff have felt the impact of the increased institutional attention to gender 
mainstreaming. Staff perceive that UNHCR is intentionally reconsidering its gender 
mainstreaming policies,194 and both headquarters and field staff reported that the AGD 
policy holds staff accountable through specific indicators.195 There is also a sense that there 
has been a change in the implementation of gender mainstreaming practices, with more 
support being provided and a more localized approach encouraged.196  
 
Additionally, UNHCR has increased significantly its research and policy efforts in the area 
of disaster risk reduction. The agency released numerous reports197 over the past several 
years outlining UNHCR’s unique place at the intersection of environmental degradation, 
climate change, and human displacement. These reports come alongside significant new 
investment and development in operationalizing DRR, including a new position at 
headquarters to provide technical support on DRR and climate change initiatives. As one 
staff member noted, “For us, DRR work is pretty new…Traditionally, we’re a response 
agency. Now, within areas we have a say, within our camps, we have in place DRR 
activities.”198   
                                                
191 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR Age, Gender and Diversity Policy: Working with people and 
communities for equality and protection,” (June 2011), accessed February 10, 2016, http://www.unhcr.org/4e7757449.html.   
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people and communities for equality and protection,” (June 2011), accessed February 10, 2016, 
http://www.unhcr.org/4e7757449.html).    
193 Leslie Groves, Global Analysis 2012-2013, UNHCR Accountability Frameworks for Age, Gender and Diversity 
Mainstreaming and Targeted Actions, (2013), http://www.unhcr.org/51c4569f9.html.   
194 Interviews: 18 Dec 2015, 6 Jan 2016, 21 Jan 2016. 
195 Interviews: 12 Dec 2015, 18 Dec 2015.  
196 Interviews: 18 Dec 2015, 6 Jan 2016, 21 Jan 2016.  
197 See: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR, Displacement and Disaster Risk Reduction,”  (2015), 
http://www.unhcr.org/5665945e9.pdf; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “UNHCR and Environmental Change: 
Protection, Migration, Adaptation,” (January 2012), 
http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/portugues/eventos/UNHCR_and_environmental_change.pdf?view=1; United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and International Institute for Educational Planning, Integrating 
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Planned Relocations, Disasters and Climate Change: Consolidating Good Practices and Preparing for the Future, Brookings-
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Human mobility in the context of loss and damage from climate change: Needs, gaps and roles of the Convention in 
addressing loss and damage, (October 2012), http://www.unhcr.org/540854f49.html.    
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While UNHCR has moved forward on gender mainstreaming overall, integrating gender 
into the new DRR policies has advanced on a mainly individual basis. While staff working 
on DRR are aware of differentiated use and access of natural resources for men and women, 
as well as the connections between women’s livelihoods and natural resource 
management,199 the new environmentally focused reports and policies are lacking in gender 
inclusive language and overall gender analysis.200 While UNHCR’s progress is to be 
commended, the agency should find ways to integrate these two new crosscutting issues 
simultaneously.    
 
UNEP 
  
UNEP has continued to create stronger gender mainstreaming policies, moving forward 
with the help of a rigorous self-review process. Internally, UNEP staff members feel 
strongly that there has been significant overall improvement when addressing gender 
considerations and the role that gender plays in UNEP’s mission and mandate.201 One staff 
member described it as a new level of commitment: “Overall in UNEP, the issue of gender 
and gender mainstreaming has been taken up at a level of seriousness over the last maybe 
three or four years that didn’t exist before.”202 
 
After a series of evaluations on UNEP’s Gender Plan of Action, the agency unrolled its 
Policy and Strategy for Gender Equality and the Environment for 2014-2017203. This 
document is a comprehensive policy statement and operational framework from which the 
agency has been instituting reforms targeted to better integrate gender mainstreaming into 
its work. It includes a business model for gender mainstreaming, a tailored strategy for 
every program within the agency, and an accountability framework.204  
 
The agency also created a Gender and Social Safeguards Unit in 2012, intended as a 
headquarters base for gender mainstreaming. One of the main tasks of the office is to 
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204 Ibid. 
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ensure that all UNEP projects are reviewed for gender analysis. A new tool, the UNEP 
Gender Marker, launched officially in early 2016, is intended to make this process easier by 
providing minimum specifications for project document, analysis, implementation, and 
results.205 All projects will be reviewed and compared to the Marker’s baseline as part of the 
routine project review process.  
 
Staff members in the field also report that gender mainstreaming practices are mandatory. 
One staff member noted, “It’s part and parcel of the project development. We make a 
specific effort to look at, and work with women's organizations, the number of women 
present on management and steering committees.”206 Staff members talked about the 
availability of best practices for gender mainstreaming,207 indicating that it was not 
difficult to access information on integrating gender in programmatic work.  
 
It is important to note, however, that challenges remain despite UNEP’s substantial 
progress. The Gender and Social Safeguards office is a show of headquarters commitment 
to the issue, but currently only three people – only two of whom work on gender – staff it. 
UNEP staff members interviewed feel that the agency is doing well on integrating gender 
mainstreaming into policies.208 Multiple headquarters staff feel that there needs to be more 
focus on the implementation required for the translation of policies to programming.209 As 
one staff member noted,  
“[The] gender work is...quite high-level… A lot of our work, doing guidelines for 
government, running some workshop, doing some research paper. [we have] done a 
lot which is very successful, but all based on assumption that document or workshop 
will trickle some changes in people’s minds or behavior.”210  
The strengthening of gender mainstreaming policies can best be associated with a 
strengthening of projects and daily work deliverables. 
 
Policies are not yet successfully operationalized in all measures. The Gender Marker 
indicates progress in gender analysis on projects, but there was also a strong sense among 
staff that the responsibility for gender mainstreaming mainly falls on individuals.211 This 
was especially relevant to gender focal points inside various offices. While gender focal 
points were considered well-integrated into their individual units,212 the status of the 
gender focal point as a voluntary position allows for significant variance in levels of 
involvement. There is also limited capacity of support for gender focal points from 
headquarters. Gender focal points feel strongly that they want more training for their work, 
as there is currently no mandatory gender mainstreaming training.213  
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USAID  
 
USAID has continued to strengthen its policies related to gender mainstreaming. 
Additionally, the first operational principle in the USAID Policy Framework 2011-2015 is 
“Promote Gender Equality and Female Empowerment.”214 This principle is supported by 
specific instructions on implementation in each step of the program cycle. The Agency 
already had strong policies in place, and it has moved even further to put women in the 
narrative, including language that is innovative. USAID has made gender mainstreaming a 
clear priority and wants to be a leader in this issue.  
 
The 2012 Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy updates the 1982 Policy Paper 
on Women in Development, noting that a new policy on gender equality is necessary “to 
reflect fundamental changes in the world and the evidence that has accumulated” since the 
issuance of the 1982 policy.215 The policy is underpinned by seven guiding principles:   
• Integrate gender equality and female empowerment into USAID’s work 
• Pursue an inclusive approach to foster equality 
• Build partnerships across a wide range of stakeholders 
• Harness science, technology, and innovation to reduce gender gaps and empower 
women and girls 
• Address the unique challenges in crisis and conflict-affected environments; Serve as 
a thought-leader and a learning community 
• Hold ourselves accountable216  
 
In 2013, a new chapter in USAID’s policies and requirements, Automated Directives 
System (ADS) 205, was added about integrating gender equality and female empowerment 
in USAID’s program cycle, which elaborates on previous requirements in ADS 201, 202, and 
203 on integrating gender equality and women’s empowerment in all phases of 
programming, budgeting, and reporting. The chapter applies to all Bureaus and Missions in 
Washington and in the field.217 Staff members were clear that USAID also enforces 
mandatory gender mainstreaming guidelines for partner and implementing organizations 
through a multi-stage process in which implementing partners and USAID technical teams 
work to refine programming to better serve women’s needs. These steps further 
institutionalize the mechanisms for mainstreaming of gender-responsive programming.218  
 
                                                
 214United States Agency for International Development, Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy, (Washington, 
DC: United States Agency for International Development, March 2012): 3, 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1865/GenderEqualityPolicy_0.pdf.  
215 Ibid, 1. 
216 Ibid, 1-2. 
217 United States Agency for International Development, “ADS Chapter 205: Integrating Gender Equality and Female 
Empowerment in USAID’s Program Cycle,” Bureau for Planning, Policy and Learning (July 2013): 3, 
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/205.pdf. 
218 Interviews, 11 Dec 2015a, 12 Jan 2016b, 15 Jan 2016. 
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USAID has implemented programming to build long-term resilience in Haiti, specifically 
focusing on urban DRR, disaster preparedness, and support to the government for 
stockpiling emergency supplies. Women are included in local community intervention 
teams to improve community participation in disaster preparedness efforts and to diversify 
perspectives to create better results.219 USAID appears to have a greater ability than other 
major organizations to ensure that their implementing partners include gender explicitly in 
project design and implementation. Implementing partners participate in an extended 
discussion with USAID technical experts, who help to refine program design and ensure 
that each program is gender-responsive.220  
 
USAID staff members noted that since the issuance of the 2012 policy, gender is taken 
more seriously in their roles and in interactions with colleagues, and that there has been an 
increased focus on gender in humanitarian assistance and DRR programming. Staff 
members feel positively about the stronger emphasis placed on incorporating women’s 
needs and capabilities, though there is a need for more resources specifically tied to gender 
analysis and gendered response within specific sectors. USAID staff seem confident in the 
institutional mechanisms in place to ensure that the design and implementation of 
programming is gender mainstreamed; while staff members in the other organizations 
discussed in this report often find that the responsibility for mainstreaming rests with 
individuals or specific teams, USAID staff seem confident in the system of technical 
advisors and program design and monitoring to ensure that programming is gender-
responsive.221  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
219 Interview, 15 Jan 2016.  
220 Interview, 15 Jan 2016.  
221 Interviews, 8 Dec 2015, 12 Jan 2016b, 15 Jan 2016, 30 Jan 2016.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
 
The response to the Haiti earthquake and long-term DRR assistance provided by OCHA, 
UNHCR, UNEP, and USAID provide valuable insight into the nexus of gender, DRR, and 
humanitarian assistance. This is a key intersection to understand in order to organize 
effective and inclusive responses to future disasters, and to build more resilient 
communities that can better withstand catastrophic natural disasters and prevent potential 
crises.  
 
Humanitarian response and DRR have undergone real and significant changes between 
2010 and 2015. The advancement of women’s inclusion and support for a gender-responsive 
lens in global discourse has started to shift institutional attitudes toward seeing gender-
responsive programming as essential to life-saving rather than as an optional add-on. The 
humanitarian response and DRR organizations examined in this study have created 
frameworks and accountability mechanisms to ensure that program design, 
implementation, and evaluation are gender-responsive. Gender-responsive approaches 
appear to be mainstreamed more effectively in recovery and development work than in 
emergency response, though fully integrating gender considerations into both emergency 
response and long-term DRR is still a significant challenge. When funding is short and 
resources must be distributed to different disasters around the world, gender 
mainstreaming can be very difficult and often neglected. Institutional top-down change can 
also take time to influence all offices and all staff members; interviews with staff revealed 
organizational cultures that seek to incorporate women’s voices, but which have been 
inefficient in clarifying the distinction between gender, gender mainstreaming, and gender-
based violence (GBV), as well as the role of gender advisors and gender focal points. The 
operationalization of guidelines and plans has been slow, inconsistent, and with mixed 
results. Serious challenges remain to meaningful gender mainstreaming, but, at the same 
time, these organizations have taken real steps to address gender inequality through policy 
and programming. 
 
These four organizations offer interesting insights into how policy informs response, and 
how institutional culture can shift, even within the span of five years. The change in these 
organizations has been catalyzed by a shift in global discourse about the importance of 
including women’s voices, needs, and capabilities in programming. This broader 
conversation has informed both top-down policy shifts and bottom-up changes in staff roles 
and responsibilities. Institutional requirements and policies create the framework for 
gender analysis and accountability, but it is individual staff members and offices that 
actively work to include women’s needs, abilities, and perspectives into programming on a 
daily basis. 
 
Each of the organizations discussed in this study provided different services and were 
guided by different sets of guidelines and policies. While OCHA’s inclusion of gender was 
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relatively strong in its construction of Flash Appeals in the wake of the earthquake, its 
dependence on partner organizations for implementation and data limited its ability to 
ensure that its resources were distributed in a gender-responsive manner. Since 2010, 
OCHA has strengthened its policies related to gender, and has created more specific 
requirements and expectations for its staff related to gender. UNHCR has moved forward 
significantly on their gender mainstreaming policies, but still lack significant integration in 
their burgeoning DRR field. UNEP’s institutional commitment to gender mainstreaming is 
significant, but there remain challenges in operationalizing its strong policies. USAID, 
using a strong gender framework, incorporated women’s needs into its response, though 
during the emergency response phase this was largely focused on GBV-related 
programming. However, USAID continued to strengthen its policies and programming to 
focus on women’s involvement in the economy and in community-based DRR strategies.  
 
Gender and the environment are issues that the international humanitarian response 
community must be able to address effectively in order to respond to disasters and prevent 
future crises. Many people and organizations are paying attention to these issues 
separately, but few are specifically studying and analyzing the intersection of DRR and 
gender. A clear understanding of this intersection and the best practices for gender-
sensitive response to disasters is crucial for all humanitarian assistance organizations, and 
building resilience using a gender lens is important for building strong and vital 
communities around the world. This study provides insight into the nexus of gender, DRR, 
and humanitarian response, and seeks to draw lessons from the emergency response and 
long-term capacity-building assistance in Haiti between 2010 and 2015.   
 
The 2010 Haiti earthquake devastated the country and disrupted normal life, exacerbating 
vulnerabilities and threatening women’s political, economic, and social space. Haiti is a 
country full of resilient communities who have responded to and recovered from the many 
natural disasters to which the country is subject. However, a stronger infrastructure for 
disaster response and recovery, and one that incorporates the perspectives of women, is 
crucial for long-term development and economic revitalization. Humanitarian organizations 
play a significant role in helping communities rebuild, and this can only be successful when 
all members of the community, women and men, are included.  
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